The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984:  New Hope for Substitute Victim Restitution? by Boulden, Jeffrey C.
Valparaiso University Law Review 
Volume 23 
Number 1 Fall 1988 pp.75-109 
Fall 1988 
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: New Hope for Substitute 
Victim Restitution? 
Jeffrey C. Boulden 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jeffrey C. Boulden, The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: New Hope for Substitute Victim Restitution?, 23 
Val. U. L. Rev. 75 (1988). 
Available at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol23/iss1/8 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by 
the Valparaiso University Law School at ValpoScholar. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Valparaiso University 
Law Review by an authorized administrator of 
ValpoScholar. For more information, please contact a 
ValpoScholar staff member at scholar@valpo.edu. 
NOTES
THE SENTENCING REFORM ACT OF 1984:
NEW HOPE FOR SUBSTITUTE VICTIM
RESTITUTION?
Federal criminal law is on the verge of a dramatic reformation. The
enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984' promises to bring
profound fundamental changes to the federal criminal justice system.' One
area of sentencing that has been dramatically affected by the Sentencing
Reform Act is probation.3 Under this new law even the very nature of pro-
bation has been changed.4
Probation has also been changed in regard to the conditions which may
or must be imposed upon an offender. Under the Federal Probation Act,'
district court judges were given broad discretion, but very little guidance, in
their determination of probationary conditions.' In marked contrast, the
Sentencing Reform Act sets forth both mandatory and discretionary condi-
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3586 (1985). The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 is contained
in Chapter II of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984. Act of October 12, 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-473, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws (98 Stat.) 1976, [hereinafter
the Sentencing Reform Act]. The Sentencing Reform Act was passed on October 12, 1984.
All relevant portions of this Act took effect on November 1, 1987.
2. An example of the changes in the federal criminal justice system prompted by the
Sentencing Reform Act is the rejection of rehabilitation as the primary goal of sentencing. See
infra note 80.
3. The Sentencing Reform Act repeals the Federal Probation Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3651-
3655. Act of October 12, 1984, Pub. L. 98-473, Title 11, c. II § 212 (a)(])-(2); 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (98 Stat.) 1976, 1987.
4. Probation was defined as "a period of grace in order to aid the rehabilitation of a
penitent offender; to take advantage of an opportunity for reformation which actual service of
the suspended sentence might make less probable." Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 220
(1932). However, probation is no longer a 'period of grace' in lieu of a sentence. Probation is
now an actual sentence. See infra note 84 (discussing the change in probation under the Sen-
tencing Reform Act).
5. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3651-3655 (1985).
6. See infra note 52 for the relevant text of the Federal Probation Act.
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tions of probation
The list of discretionary conditions in the Sentencing Reform Act is
particularly extensive.8 The Sentencing Reform Act provides the district
courts with a wide range of options to allow district judges the necessary
flexibility with which to fashion appropriate sentences. 9 However, the list of
discretionary conditions is not exclusive. 10 Thus, the district court judge
benefits from the guidance provided by the list of conditions set out in the
Sentencing Reform Act, yet retains the wide range of discretion he for-
merly had under the Federal Probation Act. Arguably, under the Sentenc-
ing Reform Act the district judge has even greater discretion.
The enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 has reopened
the debate over the legality of using charitable contributions1 as conditions
of probation. 2 Under the Federal Probation Act,' 3 a considerable amount
of controversy existed in both the courts' 4 and the academic community 15
7. 18 U.S.C. § 3563 (1985). See infra note 83 for the relevant text.
8. See id.
9. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 50, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3220, 3233. See also infra note 84 (discussing the use of probation to fulfill the
goals of the Sentencing Reform Act).
10. See 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(20) (1985). The Sentencing Reform Act states that the
court may provide that the defendant "satisfy such other conditions as the court may impose."
Id. The legislative history of the Sentencing Reform Act further evidences the intent of Con-
gress that the list of discretionary conditions not be interpreted as exclusive. "The list is not
exhaustive, and it is not intended at all to limit the court's options-conditions of a nature very
similar to, or very different from, those set forth may also be imposed." S. REP. No. 225,
supra note 9, at 95, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 3278.
11. The charitable contributions referred to are monetary payments to either charitable
or community service organizations. These payments are ordered as conditions of probation to
punish the offender for his criminal conduct and not as restitution for any specific harm caused
by him. If an offender causes direct harm to such an organization, he can be ordered to make
restitution to that organization under the Sentencing Reform Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(3)
(1985). Likewise, an offender could have been ordered to make restitution to a community
organization under the Federal Probation Act, if that organization had been directly harmed
by the offender's conduct. See 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1985).
12. Even before the Sentencing Reform Act took effect, one commentator stated that
charitable contributions should be considered as a valid condition of probation for corporate
offenders under the new law. See Note, Charitable Contributions as a Condition of Federal
Probation for Corporate Defendants: A Controversial Sanction Under New Law, 60 N.D.L.
REV. 530 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Controversial Sanction].
13. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3651-3655 (1985).
14. See generally United States v. John Scher Presents, Inc., 746 F.2d 959 (3rd Cir.
1984) (condition of probation that offender contribute $100,000 to charities to be named by
probation department held to violate § 3651); United States v. Missouri Valley Constr. Co.,
741 F.2d 1542 (8th Cir. 1984) (condition of probation that defendant contribute $1,475,000 to
the University of Nebraska to endow a chair in business ethics held to violate § 3651), overrul-
ing United States v. William Anderson Co., 698 F.2d 911 (8th Cir. 1982) (condition of proba-
tion that corporate defendant could elect to pay part of its fine to the charitable organizations
for which its officers and employees had been ordered to perform community service work held
[Vol. 23
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regarding the legality of charitable contributions. While the debate primar-
ily involved the interpretation of the Federal Probation Act,' 6 other con-
valid under § 3651); United States v. Wright Contracting Co., 728 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1984)
(condition of probation that one defendant contribute $175,000 to a Baltimore jobs program
and that another pay $10,000 to a charity named by the probation department held to violate
§ 3651); United States v. Prescon Corp., 695 F.2d 1236 (10th Cir. 1982) (conditions of proba-
tion that defendants contribute $50,000 and $75,000 respectively, to community agencies se-
lected by the chief probation officer with the approval of the court held to violate § 3651);
United States v. Clovis Retail Liquor Dealers Trade Ass'n, 540 F.2d 1389 (10th Cir. 1976)
(condition of probation that defendants pay a total of $233,500 to a community alcohol treat-
ment center held to violate § 3651); United States v. Gustafson, 587 F. Supp. 548 (D. Minn.
1984) (offer by defendant to make substantial payments to community social service programs
as a condition of probation, in lieu of incarceration, rejected by trial court as in violation of §
3651). But cf United States v. Mitsubishi Int'l. Corp., 677 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1982) (the
court declined to rule on the validity of condition of probation requiring the defendant to make
a payment to a community program for ex-offenders in lieu of fine, stating that if offender
objected to condition of probation, offender could elect to pay the statutory fine).
15. See generally Adair, Looking at the Law: Charitable Contributions, 50 FED. PRO-
BATION 78 (Dec. 1986) [hereinafter Adair, Charitable Contributions] (discussing United
States v. Haile); Kahn, Looking at the Law: Charitable Contributions as Conditions of Proba-
tion, 48 FED. PROBATION 80 (Dec. 1984) (concluding that charitable contributions are an
improper condition of probation under the Federal Probation Act); Kahn, Looking at the Law:
Corporate Sentencing: Update on Creative Probation Conditions, 47 FED. PROBATION 56
(Dec. 1983) (discussing creative probationary conditions, including charitable contributions, in
federal sentencing); Kutcher, Looking at the Law: The White Collar Criminal: Probation
Conditions of Community Service and Charitable Contributions, 45 FED. PROBATION 63
(Sept. 1981) (discussing the use of charitable contributions as a creative condition of probation
for corporate offenders); Yeager, Community Redress Against the Corporate Offender, 21-22
CRIME AND SOCIAL JUsTIcE 223 (1984) (advocating the use of charitable contributions for
corporate offenders); Note, Corporate Contributions to Charity as a Condition of Probation
Under the Federal Probation Act, 9 J. CORP. L. 241 (1984) [hereinafter Note, Corporate
Contributions] (concluding that charitable contributions are valid conditions of probation
under the Federal Probation Act); Note, Punishing the Corporation: Charitable Contributions
as a Condition of Probation, 15 RUTGERS L.J. 1069 (1984) [hereinafter Note, Punishing the
Corporation] (charitable contributions are valid under the Federal Probation Act, but not an
effective deterrent to corporate crime); Comment, United States v. William Anderson Co.:
"Crime in the Suites" Alternative Sentencing of Corporate Defendants, 16 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 1025 (1983) [hereinafter Comment, Crime in the Suites] (discussing United States v.
William Anderson Co.); Comment, United States v. William Anderson Co.: Monetary Condi-
tions of Probation Under the Federal Probation Act, 69 IOWA L. REv. 1147 (1984) [hereinaf-
ter Comment, Monetary Conditions] (criticizing the 8th Circuit's reasoning in United States
v. William Anderson Co., which held that charitable contributions are valid conditions of pro-
bation under the Federal Probation Act); Comment, Corporations and the Federal Probation
Act-Is the Community an Aggrieved Party?: United States v. William Anderson Co., 58 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 163 (1983) [hereinafter Comment, Corporations and the Federal Probation
Act] (criticizing the 8th Circuit's decision in United States v. William Anderson Co.).
16. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3651-3655 (1985). The relevant portions of the statute are set out
infra notes 39 and 52. Those who favored the idea of charitable contributions cited the permis-
sive language in the statute as providing for wide discretion in the setting of probationary
conditions. Specifically cited by some courts are the phrases "upon such terms and conditions
as the court deems best," "among the conditions thereof," and "may be required." See, e.g.,
1988]
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cerns were raised regarding the propriety of conditioning probation upon
the offender making a contribution to a charitable organization.1 7 Until the
Sentencing Reform Act was passed, it did not appear as if the federal
courts could require charitable contributions as conditions of probation.18
This note proposes that a condition of probation which requires an of-
fender to make a charitable contribution can best be referred to as Substi-
tute Victim Restitution (SVR). This note further proposes that as a condi-
tion of probation, SVR is an effective sentencing tool. In his article,
Community Redress Against the Corporate Offender, Matthew Yeager first
coined the term Substitute Victim Restitution.19 Yeager used the term Sub-
stitute Victim Restitution to describe the condition of probation placed
upon a corporate offender who was ordered to make a "donation" to a local
William Anderson Co., 698 F.2d at 914; United States v. Wright Contracting Co., 563 F.
Supp. 213, 215-16 (D. Md. 1983), rev'd, 728 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1984).
Those who took the position that charitable contributions were not provided for by the
Federal Probation Act did so on the basis of a narrow construction of the Act. It was argued
that the specific conditions of probation listed in the statute necessarily restricted the general
grant of discretionary authority. The Federal Probation Act specifically listed three monetary
conditions of probation: a fine, restitution, and support. Therefore, other monetary conditions
were arguably not permitted. See John Scher Presents, Inc., 746 F.2d at 964 (condition of
probation that offender contribute $100,000 to charities to be named by probation department
held to violate § 3651); Missouri Valley Constr. Co., 741 F.2d at 1549 (condition or probation
that defendant contribute $1,475,000 to the University of Nebraska to endow a chair in busi-
ness ethics held to violate § 3651); Wright Contracting Co., 728 F.2d at 651-52 (condition of
probation that one defendant contribute $175,000 to a city of Baltimore jobs program and that
another pay $10,000 to a charity named by the probation department held to violate § 3651);
Prescon Corp., 695 F.2d at 1243 (conditions of probation that defendants contribute $50,000
and $75,000 respectively, to community agencies selected by the chief probation officer with
the approval of the court held to violate § 3651); Clovis Retail Liquor Dealers Trade Ass'n,
540 F.2d at 1390 (condition of probation that defendants pay a total of $235,000 to a commu-
nity alcohol treatment center held to violate § 3651); Gustafson, 587 F. Supp. 548 (offer by
defendant to make substantial payments to community social service programs as a condition
of probation, in lieu of incarceration, rejected by trial court as in violation of § 3651).
17. One such concern involved the difficulty that trial courts would have in selecting
the proper charitable organization. It was argued that courts are ill equipped for such a task.
Missouri Valley Constr. Co., 741 F.2d at 1550. Another potential problem cited was the possi-
ble appearance of impropriety on the part of the court when it orders a payment of money to
someone other than the government or a victim of the crime. Id.
18. Prior to the enactment of the relevant sections of the Sentencing Reform Act on
November 1, 1987, not a single circuit court had accepted the idea of using charitable contri-
butions as conditions of probation under the Federal Probation Act. Indeed, four circuit courts
had explicitly rejected the idea of charitable contributions. See United States v. John Scher
Presents, Inc., 746 F.2d 959 (3rd Cir. 1984); United States v. Missouri Valley Constr. Co.,
741 F.2d 1543 (8th Cir. 1984) overruling United States v. William Anderson Co., 698 F.2d
911 (8th Cir. 1982); United States v. Wright Contracting Co., 728 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1984);
United States v. Prescon Corp., 695 F.2d 1236 (10th Cir. 1982). There are, as of this writing,
no reported decisions involving the use of charitable contributions as conditions of probation
under the Sentencing Reform Act.
19. Yeager, supra note 15, at 225.
[Vol. 23
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community service organization.2" Yeager took the position that Substitute
Victim Restitution could be an excellent method of funding important com-
munity services.2 However, Yeager's analysis of the nature of and potential
uses for SVR was rather incomplete.2
The courts have also been incomplete in their analysis of charitable
contributions. Each court has focused on only one or two of the relevant
issues.23 Yet each court has added something to the overall analysis. One of
the purposes of this note is to fully develop the concept of Substitute Victim
Restitution as a probationary condition.
Part I of this note briefly discusses the historical development of proba-
tion in the federal courts. Part II analyzes the debate regarding the use of
charitable contributions as conditions of probation under the Federal Proba-
tion Act. This analysis focuses primarily on the reasoning of those courts
that objected to the use of charitable contributions. Part III discusses how
the changes provided for in the Sentencing Reform Act may have elimi-
nated the objections raised to charitable contributions under the Federal
Probation Act. This note proposes that, under the Sentencing Reform Act,
a charitable contribution should be a valid condition of probation. Part IV
develops the concept of Substitute Victim Restitution. This discussion com-
pares and contrasts SVR with more traditional conditions of probation in
order to elucidate the true characteristics of SVR. This note proposes that
SVR can best be understood as a hybrid of these traditional probationary
conditions. Further, this section proposes that SVR can be an effective tool
in meeting the goals for sentencing as set out in the Sentencing Reform
Act.2 Lastly, Part V recommends guidelines for the effective use of SVR in
the sentencing of individual offenders.2 5
20. Id.
21. Id. at 226.
22. Yeager focused primarily on the value of SVR in funding community programs.
While Yeager briefly noted that SVR could serve punishment, deterrent, and reparative func-
tions, Yeager did not address how SVR can achieve these sentencing goals. See generally
Yeager, supra note 15. This note analyzes how SVR can serve punishment, deterrent, and
reparative functions, as well as provide funding for important community programs.
23. For example, the Eighth Circuit relied primarily on the fact that charitable contri-
butions act as a deterrent by focusing the attention of the community on the offender and his
illegal conduct. United States v. William Anderson Co., 698 F.2d 911, 913 (8th Cir. 1982),
rev'd, United States v. Missouri Valley Constr. Co., 741 F.2d 1542 (8th Cir. 1984). The court,
however, failed to mention the potential value to the community of the use of SVR to fund
important community services. See generally Yeager, supra note 15. Moreover, neither Yeager
nor the courts have discussed the benefit that SVR offers by fostering the offender's sense of
responsibility for the actual harm that his acts have caused the community. See infra notes
158-85 and accompanying text.
24. See infra note 80 (discussing the goals for sentencing in the Sentencing Reform
Act).
25. Most of the case law under the Federal Probation Act regarding charitable contri-
1988]
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I. PROBATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS-AN HISTORICAL
DEVELOPMENT
District court judges have not always had the option of probation in
the sentencing of an offender. In 1916, the United States Supreme Court
held, in Ex parte United States (Killits), that federal trial court judges did
not have the authority to suspend a statutorily mandated sentence and place
an offender on probation.2" In Killits, Judge Melvin Killits sentenced a de-
fendant, who had pleaded guilty to charges of embezzlement, to five years
in prison.27 Judge Killits then suspended the sentence "during the good be-
havior of the defendant."28 When Judge Killits refused to reverse himself in
the face of the government's objections, the United States sought a writ of
mandamus from the Supreme Court to force the judge to do so. 29
A unanimous Supreme Court, citing the distribution of power estab-
lished by the Constitution, rejected Judge Killits' contention that the ability
to suspend sentences was inherent in the judicial power.30 The Court stated
that the determination of appropriate punishments for crime is within the
legislative authority.31 Within this authority, the legislature has the power
to determine the scope of judicial review in executing the statutorily man-
dated punishment.32 The Court held that absent an express grant by the
legislature, the district courts were without the authority to suspend a statu-
tory sentence.33
The Court also stated that the separation of powers established by the
Constitution provided that the authority to relieve an offender from a statu-
tory sentence was within the executive branch. 4 Therefore, to allow the
butions as conditions of probation involved corporate defendants. See supra note 14. The aca-
demic writing regarding charitable contributions and the Federal Probation Act has also fo-
cused on corporations. See supra note 15. Further, one commentator has even suggested
possible guidelines for the use of charitable contributions in the sentencing of corporate offend-
ers under the Sentencing Reform Act. See Note, Controversial Sanction, supra note 12. How-
ever, Substitute Victim Restitution can be an effective probationary condition in the sentencing
of certain types of individual offenders as well. See infra notes 200-27 (discussing guidelines
for the use of SVR, specifically with offenders convicted of inherently economic crimes). For
this reason this note will deal with SVR and the sentencing of individuals.
26. Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27 (1916) (Killits).
27. Id. at 37.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 39. See also Greenberg, Probation Conditions and the First Amendment:
When Reasonableness is Not Enough, 17 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 45, 50-51 (1981) (dis-
cussing the Killits case).
30. Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. at 41-42.
31. Id. at 42.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 42.
[Vol. 23
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courts to suspend legislatively mandated sentences would amount to a usur-
pation of the constitutional authority of the executive. 5 The Court con-
cluded that Judge Killits had exceeded his sentencing authority by sus-
pending a sentence and placing an offender on probation.3" The Court
further concluded that any possible recourse for the concept of allowing the
district courts to suspend sentences would have to come from Congress.37
Such recourse arrived nine years later with the passage of the Federal
Probation Act of 1925.38 Under the Federal Probation Act, Congress
granted to the district courts the authority to suspend the imposition of a
statutory sentence.39 The Federal Probation Act also authorized the district
judge to place the offender on probation "upon such terms as the court
deems best."'40 The primary policy behind the passage of the Act was to
promote the rehabilitation of offenders.4' Proponents of probation felt that
the purpose of probation, especially for young offenders, was to provide a
"period of grace in order to aid the rehabilitation of a penitent offender."42
Some judges interpreted this policy of rehabilitation to be the only limita-
tion on their discretionary authority in setting the terms of probation under
the Federal Probation Act.43
II. CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS AND THE FEDERAL PROBATION ACT
The debate over the legality of using charitable contributions as condi-
tions of probation, under the Federal Probation Act, focused primarily on
the interpretation of the Act.44 The proponents of charitable contributions
35. Id.
36. Id. at 52.
37. Id.
38. Act of March 4, 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-596, 43 Stat. 1259 (most recent version
codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3651-3655 (1985)) [hereinafter Federal Probation Act].
39. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1985). The Federal Probation Act provided that:
Upon entering a judgment of conviction of any offense not punishable by death or life
imprisonment, any court having jurisdiction to try offenses against the United States
when satisfied that the ends of justice and the best interest of the public as well as the
defendant will be served thereby, may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence
and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms as the court
deems best.
Id.
40. Id.
41. See Greenberg, supra note 29, at 52.
42. Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 220 (1932).
43. See, e.g., Porth v. Templar, 453 F.2d 330, 333 (10th Cir. 1971).
44. The Federal Probation Act provides the sole source of the district court's power to
suspend a sentence and place an offender on probation. United States v. Cohen, 617 F.2d 56
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 845 (1980); United States v. Ellenbogen, 390 F.2d 537 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 918 (1968). See also Ex parle United States, 242 U.S. 27 (1916);
supra notes 24-35 and accompanying text (discussing Ex parte United States).
1988]
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were for the most part trial court judges faced with the task of meeting the
goals of sentencing under the Federal Probation Act." Dissatisfied with the
traditional tools of sentencing, fines,4" and imprisonment,47 judges looked
for alternative sanctions to achieve those goals."
Some district court judges viewed charitable contributions as legiti-
mate sentencing alternatives. 9 These judges saw the permissive language 0
45. The primary goal of sentencing under the Federal Probation Act was the rehabili-
tation of offenders. See supra note 4. The theory of rehabilitation is based on the belief that
human behavior is the product of identifiable antecedent causes. If these causes are properly
treated, then behavior can be modified. Under this theory, the purpose of a criminal justice
system is to provide the offender with the proper treatment so that he can return to society so
reformed that he will not desire or need to commit further crimes. See W. LAFAvE & A.
SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW, at 24 (2d ed. 1986).
To be sure, other theories exist concerning the purpose of punishment in a criminal justice
system. These include: general and specific deterrence, restraint or incapacitation, and retribu-
tion. See generally Id. at 22-29. However, for the better part of this century "the pendulum
has been swinging away from retribution and deterrence and in the direction of rehabilitation
as the chief goal of punishment." Id. at 28. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court, in
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949), stated that "[r]etribution is no longer the domi-
nant objective of the criminal law. Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders have become
important goals of criminal jurisprudence." Id. at 248.
46. A fine is defined as, "[t]o sentence a person convicted of an offense to pay a penalty
in money." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 569 (5th ed. 1979). Generally, the amount of money
required of an offender is proportional to the gravity of his offense. See Note, Creative Punish-
ment: A Study of Effective Sentencing Alternatives, 14 WASHBURN L.J. 57, 60 (1975) [herein-
after Note, Creative Punishment]. Fines are essentially punitive in nature. See Best & Birzon,
Conditions of Probation: An Analysis, 51 GEo. L.J. 809, 821 (1963), cited in Comment, Cor-
poration and the Federal Probation Act, supra note 15, at 167 n.25. Therefore, fines did not
meet the primary goal of sentencing under the Federal Probation Act, which was rehabilita-
tion. See supra note 45 (discussing the sentencing goals of the Federal Probation Act).
47. The general belief in the failure of imprisonment to rehabilitate offenders is exem-
plified in the legislative history of the Sentencing Reform Act. "[A]Imost everyone involved in
the criminal justice system now doubts that rehabilitation can be induced reliably in a prison
setting. ... S. REP. No. 225, supra note 9, at 38, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws at 3221.
48. The use of creativity in the fashioning of probationary conditions was approved of
by one circuit court. United States v. William Anderson Co., 698 F.2d 911 (8th Cir. 1982).
"The arsenal of the sentencing judge should contain more than the traditional weapons of fine
and imprisonment simpliciter." Id. at 913 (discussing the deterrent effect of charitable
contributions).
49. See, e.g., United States v. Wright Contracting Co., 728 F.2d 648, 650 (4th Cir.
1984). Charitable contributions would "put back into the immediate local community some of
the illegal gains which have been achieved by the [offender] from that community, and it
would serve as a deterrent as well as a. . . catharsis to help to expiate. . . guilt." Id. (quot-
ing District Judge Young from an unpublished decision of the companion case, United States
v. Mid-Atlantic Paving Co. (D. Md.)).
50. See supra note 39 and infra note 52, for the relevant text of the Federal Probation
Act. The phrases "upon such terms and conditions as the court deems best," "among the
conditions thereof," and "may be required" have been cited by some courts in support of the
position that the statute grants the courts broad discretionary authority. See, e.g., William
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of the Federal Probation Act as providing for a broad grant of judicial dis-
cretion in setting conditions of probation.5" The three monetary conditions
of probation52 listed in the Federal Probation Act were seen merely as ex-
amples of the types of conditions that the courts were permitted to set.53
Therefore, these district judges concluded that they could lawfully order
charitable contributions as conditions of probation.
The circuit courts of appeals, however, interpreted the Federal Proba-
tion Act as prohibiting the district courts from ordering charitable contribu-
tions as conditions of probation." The primary objection voiced by the
courts of appeals was that charitable contributions exceeded the district
courts' discretionary authority. Specifically, the circuit courts stated that
Anderson' Co., 698 F.2d at 914. United States v. Wright Contracting Co., 563 F. Supp. 213,
215-16 (D. Md. 1983), rev'd, 728 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1984).
51. Historical support existed for the proposition that the Federal Probation Act
granted the district courts a great deal of discretion in the setting of probationary conditions.
See United States v. Arthur, 602 F.2d 660, 664 (4th Cir. 1979) ("sentencing court has very
broad discretion in imposing conditions of probation, so long as conditions bear a reasonable
relationship to treatment of the accused"); United States v. Tonry, 605 F.2d 144, 147 (5th
Cir. 1979) (18 U.S.C. § 3651 lists some of the permissable conditions of probation but does
not list all possible conditions); United States v. Pastore, 537 F.2d 675, 680 (2nd Cir. 1976)
("It would be hard to use more general words than 'upon such terms and conditions as the
court deems best' "); United States v. Nu-Triumph, Inc., 500 F.2d 594, 596 (9th Cir. 1974)
("discretion in probation matters is limited only by the requirement that the terms and condi-
tions thereof bear a reasonable relationship to the treatment of the accused and the protection
of the public. ... ) (quoting Porth v. Templar, 453 F.2d 330, 333 (10th Cir. 1971)); Porth,
453 F.2d at 333 ("The sentencing judge has a broad power to impose conditions designed to
serve the accused and the community. The only limitation is that the conditions have a reason-
able relationship to the treatment of the accused and the protection of the public."). Judge
Gibson, in his dissent in United States v. Missouri Valley Construction Co., agreed with this
interpretation of the language in the Federal Probation Act. United States v. Missouri Valley
Constr. Co., 741 F.2d 1542, 1551-53 (8th Cir. 1984) (Gibson, J., concurring and dissenting).
52. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1985) provided, in part:
While on probation and among the conditions thereof, the defendant-
May be required to pay a fine in one or several sums; and
May be required to make restitution or reparation to aggrieved parties for actual dam-
ages or loss caused by the offense for which conviction was had; and
May be required to provide for the support of any persons, for whose support he is legally
responsible.
53. See supra note 51.
54. All but one of the circuit courts which have ruled on the legality of charitable
contributions under the Federal Probation Act have held such conditions of probation invalid.
See United States v. John Scher Presents, Inc., 746 F.2d 959 (3rd Cir. 1984); United States v.
Missouri Valley Constr. Co., 741 F.2d 1542 (8th Cir. 1984) overruling United States v. Wil-
liam Anderson Co., 698 F.2d 911 (8th"Cir. 1982); United States v. Wright Contracting Co.,
728 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1984); United States v. Prescon Corp., 695 F.2d 1236 (10th Cir.
1982). But see United States v. Mitsubishi Int'l Corp., 677 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1982) (held
that it need not consider the offender's objection to the conditions of probation because the
offender could elect to pay the statutory fine instead).
1988]
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the monetary conditions of probation listed in the Federal Probation Act
limited the broad grant of discretionary authority in the statute.55 In so
ruling, the circuit courts generally relied upon the rule of statutory interpre-
tation which states that "a specific provision will govern notwithstanding
the fact that a general provision, standing alone, may include the same sub-
ject matter." 56 Since the Federal Probation Act explicitly provided for three
monetary conditions of probation, but did not explicitly provide for charita-
ble contributions, charitable contributions were held to be invalid. 7 Judges
who ordered charitable contributions were viewed has having abused their
judicial discretion.5 8
Another objection raised by the circuit courts was that charitable con-
tributions were improper forms of restitution under the Federal Probation
Act. 59 Some circuit courts stated that as monetary conditions of probation,
charitable contributions were most like restitution.6" However, these courts
also pointed out that the Federal Probation Act provided for restitution to
"aggrieved parties" 1 and for those "actual damages .. .caused by the
offense for which conviction was had."'62 These courts applied a strict inter-
pretation to the language of the statute and held that charitable contribu-
tions were an improper condition of probation under the Federal Probation
Act.
63
55. The Federal Probation Act provided for three monetary conditions of probation: a
fine, restitution, and support. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1985). See supra note 52 for the relevant text.
56. Prescon Corp., 695 F.2d at 1243. See John Scher Presents, Inc., 746 F.2d at 963;
Missouri Valley Constr. Co., 741 F.2d at 1547; Karrell v. United States, 181 F.2d 981, 986-87
(9th Cir. 1950).
57. See cases cited supra note 56.
58. See cases cited supra note 56.
59. See United States v. John Scher Presents, Inc., 746 F.2d 959, 963-64 (3rd Cir.
1984); United States v. Wright Contracting Co., 728 F.2d 648, 653 (4th Cir. 1984); United
States v. Prescon Corp., 695 F.2d 1236, 1243 (10th Cir. 1982).
60. See cases cited supra note 59.
61. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1985). See supra note 52 for the relevant text.
62. Id.
63. See cases cited supra note 59. There was an historical basis for a strict interpreta-
tion of the restitution clause in 18 U.S.C. § 3651. For example, the words "aggrieved parties"
were interpreted only to mean those specific victims directly harmed by the offender's conduct.
See Fiore v. United States, 696 F.2d 205, 209 (2d Cir. 1982) (community at large not an
aggrieved party); United States v. Clovis Retail Liquor Dealers Trade Ass'n, 540 F.2d 1389,
1390 (10th Cir. 1976) (county council on alcoholism not an aggrieved party); United States v.
Ramirez, 555 F. Supp. 736 (E.D. Cal. 1983) (restitution is not to be used by a court in lieu of
a fine, but only to compensate persons who have been injured by the defendant's actions).
These words have also been interpreted as meaning only those victims for whose harm convic-
tion was had. See, e.g., Karrell v. United States, 181 F.2d 981, 987 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 891 (1950) (where defendant has been charged with crimes against several persons,
but convicted on only some of the counts, the court may not order the defendant, as a condi-
tion of probation, to make payments to any persons who were not aggrieved by the precise acts
charged in those counts on which conviction was had).
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Probationary conditions which required the defendant to make charita-
ble contributions were also held to be usurpations of Congress' appropria-
tion power. " The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that district courts
were not explicitly authorized to order charitable contributions as condi-
tions of probation. 5 The court stated that those district courts which had
suspended fines and then ordered charitable contributions had, in effect, or-
dered the disbursement of federal money.6" The Eighth Circuit stated fur-
ther that the Constitution explicitly granted the authority to appropriate
federal funds to the legislative branch.6 7 The court reasoned that those dis-
trict courts which ordered charitable contributions had usurped Congress'
power to appropriate federal funds. 68 The court concluded that district
judges could only order an allocation of federal funds in those manners spe-
cifically set out in the Federal Probation Act.6 9
Under the Federal Probation Act, the ordering of a charitable contri-
bution as a condition of probation was also viewed as creating the appear-
ance of judicial impropriety.70 In order for a court to order a charitable
contribution as a condition of probation, a judge would have to choose from
among a large number of legitimate organizations."1 This selection process
would bring upon the courts the potential for a great deal of criticism, as
well as potential accusations of conflict of interest. 2 Indeed, one court con-
Likewise, the phrase "actual damages . . . for which conviction was had" has been inter-
preted narrowly. See United States v. Tiler, 602 F.2d 30, 33 (2d Cir. 1979). "The well settled
construction of this langauge is that restitution may be ordered as a condition of probation
only for actual damages flowing from the specific crime charged in the indictment of which the
defendant is convicted after either a trial or plea of guilt." Id. See also United States v.
Gering, 716 F.2d 615, 622-25 (9th Cir. 1983) (defendant who had been accused of embezzling
or converting a large sum, but who pled guilty or had been convicted under an indictment
alleging the embezzlement, or conversion, of only a smaller amount cannot be required, as a
condition of probation, to make restitution of any sum greater than the amount specified in the
particular counts on which conviction was had).
64. United States v. Missouri Valley Constr. Co., 741 F.2d 1542, 1549-50 (8th Cir.
1984).
65. Id. at 1550.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Missouri Valley Constr. Co., 741 F.2d at 1549-50. The court stated that the U.S.
Constitution provides that Congress shall have the power to appropriate federal monies. Id. at
1550 (citing U.S. CoNsT., art. I, §§ 8 & 9). The court then reasoned that when a district
judge suspends a fine and orders the offender to pay that money to a charity, the judge is in
effect appropriating federal funds. Id. Absent a specific authorization by Congress, the district
judge does not have the authority to disburse federal money. Id.
69. Id.
70. See Missouri Valley Constr. Co., 741 F.2d at 1550; United States v. Wright Con-
tracting Co., 728 F.2d 648, 653 (4th Cir. 1984).
71. See Missouri Valley Constr. Co., 741 F.2d at 1550; Wright Contracting Co., 728
F.2d at 653.
72. Missouri Valley Constr. Co., 741 F.2d at 1550. The Model Code of Judicial Con-
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cluded that any potential benefits of the ability to order charitable contribu-
tions would be outweighed by the potential problems."3
In spite of these decisions, a few district court judges, persuaded of the
merits of charitable contributions as conditions of probation, have at-
tempted to circumvent the various appellate rulings.14 Some judges have
been successful in "suggesting" to offenders that they "voluntarily" make
charitable contributions prior to sentencing. 5 The Central District of Cali-
fornia succeeded simply by virtue of the fact that offenders did not appeal
the conditions of probation imposed upon them."6 The Western District of
Texas, however, was not as successful when it attempted to use its discre-
tionary authority to reduce sentences to influence an offender to make a
charitable contribution.7 Yet, despite the fact that the Western District of
duct states:
Canon 2
A Judge Should Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of
Impropriety in All His Actions
A. A judge should respect and comply with the law and should conduct himself at all
times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 2(A) (1972).
73. Wright Contracting Co., 728 F.2d at 653. "[T]he court exposes itself to possibly
justifiable and unanswerable criticisms both in respect of the particular beneficiaries selected
and the specific sums awarded them. The danger thereby created, without compensating bene-
fit, for unnecessary involvement of the criminal justice system in peripheral controversy is obvi-
ous." Id.
74. See Note, Controversial Sanction, supra note 12, at 534-35 n.20, 537 n.32.
75. In United States v. Allied Chemical Corp., for example, the district court judge
fined the defendant $13.2 million after the defendant pleaded nolo contendere to charges of
violating the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. United States v. Allied Chem. Corp., 7
Env't Rep. (BNA) 844 (1976). However, District Judge Merhige stated that he might reduce
the fine if Allied made "a voluntary effort to alleviate the suffering that resulted [from Allied's
acts]." Id. Allied thereafter spent $8 million in setting up an endowment to fund a variety of
conservation projects. Judge Merhige, in turn, reduced Allied's fine by a similar amount. See
Zim, Allied Chemical's $20 Million Ordeal with Kepone, Fortune, Sept. 11, 1978, 82, 88-89,
quoted in Note, Controversial Sanction, supra note 12, at 537 n.32.
76. In October of 1981, the United States District for the Central District of California
(Los Angeles) authorized the U.S. Probation Office to create a non-profit public benefit corpo-
ration named, "The Foundation for People." Yeager, supra note 15, at 225. Shortly thereafter,
the Central District ordered a defendant convicted of bid-rigging to make a $100,000 donation
to the Foundation for People in lieu of a $300,000 fine. United States v. Inryco, Inc., No. CR
80-0035 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 1982), cited in Yeager, supra note 15, at 225. Subsequently, the
Central District ordered other defendants to make donations as probationary conditions. See
also United States v. Cook, No. CR 84-37 (C.D. Cal. April 3, 1984) (defendant convicted of
dealing in counterfeit money ordered to make a charitable contribution to the Foundation for
People), cited in Yeager, supra note 15, at 225; United States v. Automated Laboratory
Servs., No. CR 83-104 (C.D. Cal. June 27, 1983) (defendant ordered to donate $120,000 to
the Foundation for People to establish a training program for federal probationers and parol-
ees), cited in Yeager, supra note 15, at 225-26.
77. Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allowed a sentencing judge to
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Texas was not successful, the Fifth Circuit expressed its sympathy for the
district court's intentions.78 The circuit court simply decided that the West-
ern District was without the statutory footing, under the Federal Probation
Act, to coerce a defendant to make a charitable contribution.79 Under the
Sentencing Reform Act, however, the district courts may have the requisite
statutory footing.
III. CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS AND THE SENTENCING REFORM ACT
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 brought sweeping changes to the
federal criminal justice system. 80 In repealing the Federal Probation Act,81
consider a motion to reduce a sentence, or to reduce a sentence without a motion, within 120
days after the sentence was imposed. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(b). In United States v. Haile, a
defendant was sentenced to two years in prison and fined $50,000 for violating the Sherman
Act. United States v. Haile, 795 F.2d 489, 490 (5th Cir. 1986). The United States District
Court for the Western District of Texas then suspended the sentence and placed the defendant
on probation subject to the condition that the defendant pay the fine within the 120 day pe-
riod. Id. The court stated, however, that it would consider using Rule 35 to reduce the fine if
the defendant wished to "divert" part of it (up to a maximum of 25 % of the total fine) to an
approved charity. Id. The United States objected to the sentence and appealed.
The Fifth Circuit agreed with the United States that the district court had abused its
discretion. Id. at 491. The court held that to allow the district court to use Rule 35 in such a
manner would in effect allow a judicial 'end-run' around Congress. Id. In spite of the court's
holding, the Fifth Circuit gave its tacit approval to the type of "suggestion" used by Judge
Merhige in Allied Chemical. Id. at 492; See also supra note 73 (discussing Allied Chem.).
The Fifth Circuit stated that its decision did not limit the district judges' discretionary author-
ity in tailoring conditions of probation. Haile, 795 F.2d at 492. The court merely decided that
while a judge could consider a defendant's charity, even a "charitable spirit that has flowered
only under the shadow of the jail wall," a judge could not compel an offender to make charita-
ble acts through the use of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id. See also Adair,
Charitable Contributions, supra note 15 (discussing the Haile decision).
78. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
It might be true that the rehabilitation of a person such as [the defendant] will be fos-
tered by charitable gifts or by the response from the community that they provide. It
might also be true that judicially approved charitable organizations can spend money,
and thereby benefit the community, more intelligently than can the U.S. government.
Haile, 795 F.2d at 492.
79. Id.
80. With the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act, the fundamental focus of federal
sentencing has been shifted away from the goal of rehabilitation. Sentencing Reform Act,
supra note 1, at § 3553(a)(2); see supra note 45 (stating that the primary goal of sentencing
under the Federal Probation Act was the rehabilitation of the offender). This shift in focus is
due in large measure to the belief that the federal criminal justice system has failed to meet
the goal of rehabilitation. The legislative history of the Sentencing Reform Act states that
"almost everyone involved in the criminal justice system now doubts that rehabilitation can be
induced reliably in a prison setting." S. REP. No. 225, supra note 9, at 38, reprinted in 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 3221. In support of the foregoing statement, the report
cites several recent studies which suggest the failure of the rehabilitation approach. Id. at 40
n.16, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 3223. The failure of the crimi-
nal justice system to rehabilitate offenders is blamed on a fundamental lack of understanding
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the Sentencing Reform Act established new guidelines for setting condi-
tions of probation.82 The Sentencing Reform Act also sets out both
mandatory and discretionary conditions of probation.83 Thus, the district
about human behavior. Id. at 40, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at
3223. In turn, this lack of understanding makes it difficult, even impossible, to design sentenc-
ing programs which can be reasonably relied upon to rehabilitate the offender. Id. The report
reaches the conclusion that "it is now quite certain that no one can really detect whether or
when a prisoner is rehabilitated." Id.
The Sentencing Reform Act establishes a different set of goals for federal sentencing. In
place of the failed rehabilitation model, the Sentencing Reform Act recognizes four purposes
for sentencing in the federal criminal justice system. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (1985). These
purposes are:
(A) [the need] to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect of the law, and
to provide just punishment;
(B) [the need] to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) [the need] to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) [the need] to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training,
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner ....
Id.
81. See supra note 3.
82. An example of such a guideline in the Sentencing Reform Act is the presumption
that the offender should make restitution for his crime. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (1985). The
Sentencing Reform Act requires the district judge to state his reasons in writing in the event
that the ordered sentence does not contain an order of restitution. Id.
83. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3563(a)-(b) states:
(a) Mandatory Conditions.-The court shall provide, as an explicit condition of a
sentence of probation-
(1) for a felony, misdemeanor, or an infraction, that the defendant not commit
another Federal, State, or local crime during the term of probation; and
(2) for a felony, that the defendant also abide by at least one condition set forth in
subsection (b)(2), (b)(3), or (b)(13).
(b) Discretionary Conditions.-The court may provide, as further conditions of a
sentence of probation, to the extent that such conditions are reasonably related to the
factors set forth in sections 3553(a)(1) and (a)(2) and to the extent that such conditions
involve only such deprivations of liberty or property as are reasonably necessary for the
purposes indicated in section 3553(a)(2) that the defendant-
(1) support his dependents and meet other family responsibilities;
(2) pay a fine imposed pursuant to the provisions of subchapter C;
(3) make restitution to the victims of the offense pursuant to the provisions of sec-
tion 3556;
(4) give to the victims of the offense the notice ordered pursuant to the provisions of
section 3555;
(5) work conscientiously at suitable employment or pursue conscientiously a course
of study or vocational training that will equip him for suitable employment;
(6) refrain, in the case of an individual, from engaging in a specified occupation,
business, or profession bearing a reasonably direct relationship to the conduct constituting
the offense, or engage in such a specified occupation, business, or profession only to the
stated degree or under stated circumstances;
(7) refrain from frequenting specified kinds of places or from associating unneces-
sarily with specified persons;
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judge can use the probationary conditions listed in the Sentencing Reform
Act to fashion appropriate sentences of probation."
(8) refrain from excessive use of alcohol, or any use of a narcotic drug or other
controlled substance, as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21
U.S.C. 802), without a prescription by a licensed medical practitioner;
(9) refrain from possessing a firearm, destructive device, or other dangerous
weapon;
(10) undergo available medical, psychiatric, or psychological treatment, including
treatment for drug or alcohol dependency, as specified by the court, and remain in a
specified institution if required for that purpose;
(I1) remain in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons during nights, weekends, or
other intervals of time, totaling no more than the lesser of one year or the term of impris-
onment authorized for the offense in section 3581 (b), during the first year of the term of
probation;
(12) reside at, or participate in the program of, a community corrections facility for
all or part of the term of probation;
(13) work in community service as directed by the court;
(14) reside in a specified place or area, or refrain from residing in a specified place
or area;
(15) remain within the jurisdiction of the court, unless granted permission to leave
by the court or a probation officer;
(16) report to a probation officer as directed by the court or the probation officer;
(17) permit a probation officer to visit him at his home or elsewhere as specified by
the court;
(18) answer inquiries by a probation officer and notify the probation officer
promptly of any change in address or employment;
(19) notify the probation officer promptly if arrested or questioned by a law en-
forcement officer; or
(20) satisfy such other conditions as the court may impose.
18 U.S.C. §§ 3563(a)-(b) (1985).
84. The Federal Probation Act authorized the district courts to suspend a statutory
sentence and place the offender on probation. See supra note 39. Under the Sentencing Re-
form Act, probation is now defined as a sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3561 (1985). While the differ-
ence between defining probation as a sentence rather than the suspension of a sentence may
appear to be merely semantical in nature, in fact this shift indicates a rather profound change
in the philosophy of the federal criminal justice system. One commentator has stated that this
change was made to mitigate the public perception that one who is placed on probation is
"getting off easy" because his sentence was suspended. See Note, Controversial Sanction,
supra note 12, at 539 n.48. However, this appears to be an inadequate analysis of the defini-
tional change of probation.
The definition of probation was changed to reflect the current state of modern criminal
justice philosophy. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 9, at 88, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS at 3271. A "sentence" was traditionally thought of as a period of imprison-
ment. Id. at 59, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3242. In actuality a
sentence is a device which is used to achieve the goals of the criminal justice system. Id. It has
been stated that imprisonment is considered a failure in achieving these goals. Id. at 38, re-
printed in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3221. In support of this statement, the
legislative history of the Sentencing Reform Act cites several recent studies which suggest the
failure of our prisons to effect the goals of the federal criminal justice system. Id. at 40 n.16,
reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 3223. Yet, by defining "sentence" in
terms of imprisonment, what has been achieved is an over reliance on a tool which does not
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The list of discretionary conditions of probation in the Sentencing Re-
form Act, however, does not prohibit the district court judge from creating
different conditions for probation.85 Indeed, the legislative history of the
Sentencing Reform Act makes it explicit that Congress intended that this
list be interpreted as exemplary and not exclusive.86 The report states that
"[t]he list is not exhaustive, and it is not intended at all to limit the court's
options . . .,,7
Further, the Sentencing Reform Act explicitly prohibits the use of the
rule of statutory construction which states that specific provisions govern
general provisions88 in construing the new Act.89 Congress has clearly au-
thorized the district judges to set conditions of probation which are not in-
cluded in the list of discretionary conditions set out in the Sentencing Re-
form Act.90 Congress has also authorized district court judges to establish
work. Id. at 59, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3242. The Sentenc-
ing Reform Act, by expanding the definition of "sentence" to include probation, is explicitly
authorizing district judges to use alternatives to imprisonment in order to be more effective in
meeting the goals of sentencing. Id.
85. The Sentencing Reform Act provides that the defendant can be ordered, as a con-
dition of probation, to "satisfy such other conditions as the court may impose." 18 U.S.C. §
3563(b)(20) (1985).
86. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 9, at 95, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. Naws at 3278.
87. Id.
88. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text (discussing the use of the rule of
statutory construction that the specific governs the general, under the Federal Probation Act).
89. See supra note 85.
90. Id. It should also be mentioned that the circuit courts' use of the rule of statutory
construction which states that the specific governs the general, in interpreting the Federal
Probation Act, has been criticized.
The circuit courts' reliance on cases which cite the rule that specific language governs
broad langauge [hereinafter the Rule] is supported by the results of those cases alone. United
States v. Missouri Valley Constr. Co., 741 F.2d 1542, 1552-53 (8th Cir. 1984) (Gibson, J.,
concurring and dissenting). In his separate opinion in the Eighth Circuit's decision in Missouri
Valley Construction Co., Judge Gibson criticized the court's use of the rule in reaching its
decision. Id. at 1551-53. Judge Gibson analyzed the history of the use of the Rule in the
various circuit courts and found the courts' underlying reasoning wanting. Id. at 1553.
Judge Gibson specifically criticized the inconsistency of the Tenth Circuit's dictum in
United States v. Prescon Corp. as an example of such shaky reasoning. Missouri Valley
Constr. Co., 741 F.2d at 1553. The Tenth Circuit cited the Rule in reaching its decision to
invalidate a probationary condition because the condition required the defendants to contribute
money to various community agencies. United States v. Prescon Corp., 695 F.2d 1236, 1243
(10th Cir. 1982). But, the Tenth Circuit also stated that, "[w]e do not suggest that the listing
of the four specific conditions of probation 'closes the door' to other conditions." Id. at 1242-
43, quoted in Missouri Valley Constr. Co., 741 F.2d at 1553.
This type of inconsistency in the use of the Rule has been identified as an inherent weak-
ness of the Rule. See R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES,
243 (1975), quoted in Missouri Valley Constr. Co., 741 F.2d at 1552 n.l. Dickerson stated:
[I]t is simply not true, generally, that the mere express conferral of a right or privilege in
one kind of situation implies the denial of the equivalent right or privilege in other kinds.
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probationary conditions which are "of a nature very similar to, or very dif-
ferent from, those set forth . . [in the Act] . . ."' Thus, while the Sen-
tencing Reform Act provides for three monetary conditions of probation, 92
the sentencing judge is not limited to those three. It appears reasonable to
conclude, therefore, that under the Sentencing Reform Act, charitable con-
tributions are a proper monetary condition of probation.
Likewise, a charitable contribution does not appear to be an improper
form of restitution under the Sentencing Reform Act. Under the Federal
Probation Act, several circuit courts stated93 that a charitable contribution,
as a monetary condition of probation, was most like the restitution condi-
Sometimes it does and sometimes it does not, and whether it does or does not depends on
the particular circumstances of context. Without contextual support, therefore, there is
not even a mild presumption here.
Id. Judge Gibson stated that when examined in the context of the surrounding language in the
statute, the specific provisions for probationary conditions in the Federal Probation Act should
not have been read as prohibiting the use of charitable contributions. Missouri Valley Constr.
Co., 741 F.2d at 1553.
There is also some doubt about whether the Rule is actually a rule. The Rule is based on
the Latin maxim, expressio unius est esclusio alterius. Missouri Valley Constr. Co., 741 F.2d
at 1551. Professor Dickerson stated that "[s]everal Latin maxims masquerade as rules of in-
terpretation while doing nothing more than describing results reached by other means." R.
DICKERSON, supra, at 234, quoted in Missouri Valley Constr. Co., 741 F.2d at 1552 n.l.
Professor Dickerson also stated that expressio unius is probably the best example of this kind
of problem. Id. Indeed, one court has exclaimed, in regard to these Latin maxims, that they
are as helpful in interpreting statutes as "such vials of distilled wisdom of the ages contained
in the phrases 'birds of a feather flock together' and 'man is known by the company he keeps'."
Keystone Automobile Club v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 181 F.2d 402, 404 (3rd Cir.
1950). The court continued, stating that "[t]hrowing a vague phrase into law Latin does not
make it anymore useful in construing a statute." Id. at 404-05. Thus it is a mistake to base a
judicial decision upon a "rule" with such "insubstantial underpinning." Missouri Valley Con-
str. Co., 741 F.2d at 1551-52 (Gibson, J., concurring and dissenting).
Lastly, the whole genre of rules for statutory interpretation have come under attack.
S.E.C. v. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350-51 (1943). In Joiner, the U.S. Supreme
Court stated:
Some rules of statutory construction come down to us from sources that were hostile
toward the legislative process itself and thought it generally wise to restrict the operation
of an act to its narrowest permissible compass. However well these rules may serve at
times to aid in deciphering legislative intent, they long have been subordinated to the
doctrine that courts will construe the details of an act in conformity with its dominating
general purpose, will read text in the light of context and will interpret the text so far as
the meaning of the words fairly permit so as to carry out in particular cases the generally
expressed legislative policy.
Id. In examining the overall purpose of the Federal Probation Act, Judge Gibson concluded
that charitable contributions were consistent with the general legislative intent of the statute.
Missouri Valley, 741 F.2d at 1553.
91. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 9, at 95, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws at 3278.
92. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3563(b)(1)-(3) (1985). See supra note 83 for the relevant text.
93. See cases cited supra note 59.
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tion of probation provided for in the statute.94 These circuit courts consist-
ently held that a narrow interpretation of the restitution clause of the Fed-
eral Probation Act95 prohibited the payment of restitution to anyone who
was not an "aggrieved party."98
The language of the restitution clause of the Sentencing Reform Act97
is similar to the language in the restitution clause of the Federal Probation
Act. Congress, however, has explicitly stated that the Sentencing Reform
Act is to be interpreted broadly. 8 The existence of a restitution clause in
the Sentencing Reform Act does not prohibit the district court judge from
setting a condition of probation that is similar to restitution.99 Nor does the
Sentencing Reform Act restrict the district court's interpretations of the
words in that restitution clause."' 0 Thus, it can reasonably be inferred that
the argument that charitable contributions are not permissible because they
are improper forms of restitution does not apply to the Sentencing Reform
Act.
Similarly, the objection that a charitable contribution is a usurpation
of Congress' power to appropriate federal funds does not seem to apply to
the Sentencing Reform Act. Congress intended the Sentencing Reform Act
to be interpreted broadly. 10 1 Therefore, the authorization to set conditions
of probation "of a nature very similar to"' °2 those conditions listed in the
statute, should be read as not limiting the district judge in the types of
monetary conditions of probation which he can set. Therefore, since Con-
gress has authorized the district courts to exercise such broad authority, it
cannot be said that a judge who orders a charitable contribution is usurping
Congress' authority to appropriate federal monies.
Moreover, a charitable contribution may not be a usurpation of Con-
gress' authority to appropriate federal monies because, under the Sentenc-
94. See cases cited supra note 59.
95. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 provided that the defendant "[m]ay be required to make restitu-
tion or reparation to aggrieved parties for actual damages or loss caused by the offense for
which conviction was had ...." 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1985).
96. See cases cited supra note 59.
97. 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(3) provides that the defendant may, "make restitution to a
victim of the offense .... 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(3) (1985).
98. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 9, at 95, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws at 3278.
99. Id. The Senate Report states that "conditions of a nature very similar to ... those
set forth may also be imposed." Id.
100. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 9, at 95-96, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws at 3278-79. The Senate Report states that "the court could in an appropriate
case order restitution not covered by paragraph (b)(3) under the general provisions of section
(b)(20). Id.
101. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 9, at 95, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws at 3278.
102. Id.
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ing Reform Act, the district judge is not disbursing federal funds. Under
the Federal Probation Act, district judges who attempted to set a proba-
tionary condition requiring a charitable contribution first sentenced the de-
fendant to pay a fine.10s The fine was then suspended and the offender was
ordered to make a charitable contribution.104 The suspension of the fine and
the subsequent ordering of the contribution arguably transferred federal
money into private hands.' 05
Pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act, probation is a sentence in it-
self and not a condition placed upon an offender after the suspension of a
sentence.' 08 A charitable contribution is not ordered in lieu of a fine under
the Sentencing Reform Act. 07 If a fine is never ordered and subsequently
suspended, then such monies cannot be said to have been in the federal
treasury; they were never federal funds.'08 Thus, the argument that charita-
ble contributions usurp Congress' appropriation power is weakened, because
the issue of district judges ordering the disbursement of federal funds never
arises.' 0 9 The district judge may now have the requisite "statutory foot-
ing""10 to order charitable contributions as conditions of probation.
Lastly, the proper use"' of a charitable contribution as a condition of
probation should not create the appearance of judicial impropriety under
the Sentencing Reform Act." 2 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals stated
that a charitable contribution would involve the court in the process of
choosing beneficiaries for potentially large sums of money." 3 Such a selec-
tion process could expose the court to unnecessary questioning and criti-
cism." 4 The Eighth Circuit stated that such a process could also raise the
specter of conflicts of interest." 5 These two circuit courts concluded that
the potential benefits of charitable contributions were not worth the poten-
tial risks.""'
This concern over the possible appearance of judicial impropriety has
103. See supra note 68.
104. See supra note 68.
105. See supra note 68.
106. See supra note 84.
107. See Note, Controversial Sanction, supra note 12, at 539 n.48.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. United States v. Haile, 795 F.2d 489, 492 (5th Cir. 1986).
111. See infra notes 200-27 and accompanying text for guidelines for the use of SVR.
112. See supra note 72 for the relevant text of the A.B.A. Code of Judicial Conduct.
113. United States v. Wright Contracting Co., 728 F.2d 648, 653 (4th Cir. 1984).
114. Id.
115. United States v. Missouri Valley Constr. Co., 741 F.2d 1542, 1550 (8th Cir. 1984).
116. Missouri Valley Constr. Co., 741 F.2d at 1550; Wright Contracting Co., 728 F.2d
at 653.
Boulden: The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984:  New Hope for Substitute Victi
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1988
94 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
been criticized. 117 In his dissenting opinion in United States v. Missouri
Valley Construction Co., Circuit Judge Heaney addressed this issue." 8
Judge Heaney admitted that a district judge would have to exercise care in
the selection of a beneficiary of a charitable contribution."1 9 However,
Judge Heaney pointed out that district court judges are already given broad
discretionary authority in a number of important matters. 20 The Judge
concluded that the concern over judicial impropriety was the result of an
inordinate fear that "our district court judges will not have the wisdom to
avoid possible conflicts of interest."''
Another commentator has stated that a flat ban on charitable contribu-
tions, so as to avoid the appearance of judicial impropriety, would be overly
broad.' 2 ' While a prohibition on charitable contributions would prevent a
judge from possibly abusing his discretion, it would also block payments
which would otherwise be beneficial.1"' Less drastic checks on a judge's use
of discretion are already built into the criminal justice system."" One
prominent check on judicial discretion is the fact that the prosecutor has
the right to appeal a probationary condition which the prosecutor feels is an
abuse of judicial discretion." 5 With this procedural safeguard in place, a
complete prohibition on charitable contributions seems unnecessary.,
117. See Missouri Valley Constr. Co., 741 F.2d at 1551 (Heaney, J., concurring and
dissenting); United States v. William Anderson Co., 698 F.2d 911, 914-15 (8th Cir. 1982).
118. United States v. Missouri Valley Constr. Co., 741 F.2d 1542, 1551 (8th Cir. 1984).
119. Id.
120. Id. Judge Heaney pointed to a judge's discretionary authority regarding the sched-
uling and trying of cases, as well as a judge's discretion in the sentencing of individuals to
terms of imprisonment. Id.
121. Id. See United States v. William Anderson Co., 698 F.2d 911 (8th Cir. 1982). In
William Anderson Co., the court summarily dismissed this type of argument, stating that the
concern over potential impropriety was "unmeritorious." Id. The court concluded by saying
"[i]f ever such a question comes before me, I will endeavour to answer it." Id., quoting Black-
burn, J., in Hollins v. Fowler, 44 L.J. Rep. (N.S.) 169, 176 (H.L. 1875).
122. See Note, Corporate Contributions, supra note 15, at 259. The author points out
that "[b]ecause judicial discretion is such a fundamental part of the probationary system,
there should be clear and convincing reasons before the exercise of discretion is curtailed." Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. Under the Sentencing Reform Act, both the prosecutor and the offender can
appeal a sentence. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3742(a)-(b) (1985).
126. See Note, Corporate Contributions, supra note 15, at 259. However, the concern
over the appearance of judicial impropriety is not completely unfounded. Consider the case of
In re Storie as an example. In re Storie, 574 S.W.2d 369 (Mo. 1978). In Storie, the Missouri
Supreme Court suspended a magistrate for violations of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Con-
duct. Id. at 375. At the time that he was appointed to fill a vacancy in the Pulaski County
Magistrate's office, Magistrate Storie was forced to deal with an office that was woefully ill-
equipped to carry out the business of his office. Id. at 370. The record indicated that the
courtroom was dilapidated and that there were no legal reference books or annotated statutes
available for use by the magistrate and his staff. Id. Magistrate Storie sought funding to im-
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Thus, a district judge should be able to order charitable contributions with-
out the fear of creating an appearance of impropriety.
The Sentencing Reform Act eliminates the objections that were raised
to charitable contributions under the Federal Probation Act. Further, the
new Act grants to district judges a broad scope of discretion in the fashion-
ing of probationary conditions to meet the goals of sentencing set out in the
new Act. 127 It is suggested that charitable contributions as conditions of
probation, or SVR payments, can be valuable tools to the district judge in
meeting the goals for sentencing in the Sentencing Reform Act.
IV. SUBSTITUTE VICTIM RESTITUTION
Substitute Victim Restitution (SVR) is a discretionary condition of
probation whereby the offender is ordered to make a payment to a charity
or community service organization. 128 However, the discussions regarding
the purposes and uses of SVR have to date been incomplete.1 29 SVR can
best be understood as a hybrid of three traditional conditions of probation:
prove the condition of this court, however the County Court's administrative judges repeatedly
denied Storie's requests. Id.
The prosecuting attorney for Pulaski County, who was familiar with the conditions of the
court, proposed a solution. Id. at 371. During the course of a plea negotiation, the prosecutor
suggested to Magistrate Storie that, in exchange for a dismissal of the charge [minor traffic
offense] the Magistrate should request a payment by the offender to a "Library Fund," in an
amount of equal to the fine. Id. This incident led to a four year period in which, under the
direction of the magistrate, use of the "Library Fund" expanded. Id. The fund was used to
purchase books and furnishings for the courtroom and pay wages to part-time employees and a
maintenance staff. Id. However, this situation changed when the Missouri Supreme Court re-
ceived information about the "Library Fund." Id.
The Missouri Supreme Court admitted that it appeared as if Magistrate Storie had acted
without "evil intent" in attempting to improve his court. Id. at 374. Nevertheless, the court
stated that the magistrate's conduct had created an appearance of judicial impropriety. Id. at
374. Magistrate Storie's actions had created the impression that justice was for sale in his
court. Id. at 375. The Missouri Supreme Court suspended the Magistrate for two months
without pay. Id. at 375.
The danger of a judge creating an appearance of judicial impropriety when he orders a
charitable contribution is always present. As Judge Heaney pointed out, a judge must exercise
care in the selection of a beneficiary. United States v. Missouri Valley Constr. Co., 741 F.2d
1542, 1551 (8th Cir. 1984) (Heaney, J., concurring and dissenting). A prosecutor has the right
to appeal a condition of probation which he feels is an abuse of judicial discretion. Note,
Corporate Contributions, supra note 15, at 259. While this is an important procedural safe-
guard, it is not infallible. See In re Storie, 574 S.W.2d 369 (Mo. 1978). Thus, guidelines are
needed to aid the judge in avoiding the appearance of impropriety when ordering a charitable
contribution as a condition of probation.
127. See supra note 80 (discussing the goals of sentencing under the Sentencing Reform
Act).
128. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text (discussing the name Substitute Vic-
tim Restitution).
129. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
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fines, restitution, and community service. More importantly, SVR can be
effective in meeting the goals of sentencing mandated by the Sentencing
Reform Act.
A. SVR and Fines
A fine is a sanction which deprives an offender of a certain amount of
his property.130 Fines are essentially punitive in nature.13' Similarly, SVR
32
deprives the offender of a certain amount of his property because the court
orders the offender to make a monetary payment to a charitable or commu-
nity service organization.' Like a fine, SVR serves a punitive function be-
cause the offender is forced to endure some suffering, specifically a depriva-
tion of his property.
A fine can also serve as a specific deterrent to future criminal conduct
by the offender." A fine serves the purpose of specific deterrence because
it "'quickens the sense of social responsibility' by making the offender un-
dergo some tangible sacrifice."' 35 Yet, fines are not always a successful de-
terrent to an offender's criminal activity.' 36 Nor are fines necessarily effec-
130. See supra note 46.
131. Best & Birzon, supra note 46, at 821. However, the use of the word "punitive" is in
dispute. Some writers, like Best and Birzon, define the word punitive in a narrow sense to
mean the infliction of suffering upon the offender. Id. Other writers use the term "retribution"
to mean the same thing. See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 45, at 25-26. LaFave and
Scott use the term "punishment" to incorporate all the various theories for the use of sanctions
by a society. See generally Id. at 22-29 (discussing the nature of punishment as well as the
various theories of punishment). Retribution is a theory of punishment whereby some sort of
suffering is inflicted upon the offender. Id. at 25-26. It is imposed upon offenders under the
belief that it is only fitting and just that one who has caused harm to others should himself
suffer for it. Id. at 26. Retribution embodies the theory that man is a responsible moral agent
to whom rewards are due when he makes correct moral choices, as socially defined, and to
whom punishment is due when he makes wrong ones. H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMI-
NAL SANCrION 37-38 (1968).
132. SVR is not a fine within the meaning of federal law. All collections for fines must
be deposited into official checking accounts with the Treasurer of the United States. See 28
U.S.C. § 751(e) (1985).
133. See Yeager, supra note 15, at 225.
134. This theory of punishment, called specific or particular deterrence, aims to alter
criminal behavior by subjecting the individual to such an unpleasant experience that the of-
fender will not wish to endure the experience again. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 45,
at 23 (discussing prevention).
135. Note, Creative Punishment, supra note 46, at 60 (quoting Best & Birzon, supra
note 46, at 821).
136. See Kutcher, supra note 15, at 63. "The inadequacy of traditional sentences of
fines . . . for white collar criminals is a vexing problem. Fines are rarely large enough to deter
similar criminal offenses. The individual or the corporation may view a criminal fine as only 'a
price of doing business.'" Id.
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tive in deterring criminal activity in the community as a whole.'37 The
primary criticism of fines, regarding their ability to deter crime, is that fines
are rarely large enough' 38 to be effective and they often go unnoticed by the
general public.'3 "Once the payment is made to the Treasury, the public
promptly forgets the transgression and the [defendant] continues on [his]
"1140way. ...
Deterrence is fostered by the publicity of the sentence.' 41 This is true
of both specific and general deterrence. Specific deterrence depends upon
the offender suffering in order to effect behavioral change. 42 The offender's
suffering, however, can be "heightened if it inflicts disgrace and contumely
in a dramatic and spectacular manner."' 43 By focusing public opinion on
the offender and his punishment, a judge can intensify the offender's suffer-
ing.' 44 This, in turn, increases the sanction's specific deterrent value. 45
General deterrence depends upon the public being made aware of the
offender's suffering.' 46 By focusing public opinion on the offender's punish-
ment, a judge can maximize the public's awareness of the offender's suffer-
ing.' 47 This in turn increases the effectiveness of the punishment's general
deterrence. 48 Public opinion can be sharply focused on the offender and his
punishment through the use of creative sentencing. 49
As an alternative probationary condition, SVR can be an effective tool
in achieving deterrence to crime because of its highly public nature. When
an offender is ordered to fund a chair in business ethics at a local univer-
137. This theory of punishment called general deterrence, is based on the notion that the
suffering imposed on the offender will deter others from committing future crime, lest they
suffer the same fate. W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, supra note 45, at 24-25.
138. See supra note 136.
139. See United States v. Missouri Valley Constr. Co., 741 F.2d 1542, 1551 (8th Cir.
1984) (Heaney, J., concurring and dissenting).
140. Id.
141. See Id.; United States v. William Anderson Co., 698 F.2d 911, 913 (8th Cir.
1982), overruled by United States v. Missouri Valley Constr. Co., 741 F.2d 1542 (8th Cir.
1984); United States v. Danilow Pastry Co., 563 F. Supp. 1159, 1167 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
142. See supra note 134.
143. William Anderson Co., 698 F.2d at 913. This is especially true for those offenders,
such as white-collar offenders, who may not truly suffer from the imposition of a fine. See
supra note 134. However, not even "corporate tycoons" are immune to "painful publicity."
William Anderson Co., 698 F.2d at 913. "Any imaginative realization that one will be hissed
off the social stage or suffer pain is bound to act as a strong deterrent." Cohen, Moral Aspects
of the Criminal Law, 49 YALE L.J. 987, 1015-16 (1940).
144. William Anderson Co., 698 F.2d at 913.
145. Id.
146. See supra note 137.
147. See United States v. William Anderson Co., 698 F.2d 911, 913 (8th Cir. 1982).
148. Id.
149. Id.
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sity150 or support a local community service organization,'' the public is
made aware of the offender's criminal conduct and its consequences.152 If
properly selected, 53 an SVR payment can be a continual reminder of the
offense to both the offender and the general public.' This longevity, in
turn, maximizes the deterrent effect of SVR.
B. SVR and Restitution
Restitution 55 or reparation'5 6 payments by criminal offenders have
traditionally been ordered to victims directly harmed by the offender's con-
duct.' 57 Under the Federal Probation Act,' 58 most of the circuit courts lim-
ited the payment of restitution to those victims of crimes whose injuries
constituted the basis of a charge on which the offender was convicted. 59 By
focusing on the recipient of the restitution payment, however, the circuit
courts overlooked the fact that the primary focus of criminal restitution is
on the offender.
The central rationale for the imposition of an order of restitution or
reparation is the effect such a sanction will have upon the offender's future
behavior. 60 The effect that restitution has on the offender is twofold. One
purpose for restitution is to foster the defendant's sense of responsibility for
his unlawful actions.' 6 ' By ordering restitution, the court forces the offender
150. See United States v. Missouri Valley Constr. Co., 741 F.2d 1542 (8th Cir. 1984).
151. See, e.g., United States v. Wright Contracting Co., 563 F. Supp. 213 (D. Md.
1983), rev'd, 728 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1984).
152. William Anderson Co., 698 F.2d at 913; Missouri Valley Constr. Co., 741 F.2d at
1551 (Heaney, J., concurring and dissenting).
153. See infra notes 200-27 and accompanying text for guidelines for the effective use of
an SVR payment.
154. Cf. supra note 136 and accompanying text (discussing the limitations of a fine in
effecting deterrence).
155. Restitution is defined as "the act of making good or giving equivalent for any loss,
damage, or injury." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 682 (5th ed. 1979).
156. Reparation is defined as payment or otherwise making amends for an injury or for
damages that have been committed on or to another. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 674 (5th ed.
1979).
157. Best & Birzon, supra note 46, at 826.
158. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1985). See supra note 52 for the text of the restitution clause of
the Federal Probation Act.
159. See, e.g., Karrell v. United States, 181 F.2d 981 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
891 (1950). The defendant was charged with seventeen counts of fraud, but was convicted on
only six of the counts. Id. at 982-83. The district court ordered the defendant, as a condition of
probation, to make restitution payments to all the individuals who had suffered losses as a
result of his actions. Id. at 983. The circuit court, however, held that the district judge had
abused his discretion. Id. at 987. The court further ordered that restitution only be paid to
those individuals concerned in the six counts upon which the offender was convicted. Id.
160. Best & Birzon, supra note 46, at 826.
161. United States v. McLaughlin, 512 F. Supp. 907, 909 (D. Md. 1981).
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to recognize the extent to which his actions have harmed the victim. The
second and primary effect that restitution has on the offender, however, is
as a deterrent to future criminal conduct. 6 2 The suffering inflicted upon an
offender by depriving him of his property is magnified by the public nature
of the restitution payment. This maximizes the deterrent effect of the
sanction.'13
Yet, despite the usefulness of restitution as a deterrent to crime, the
circuit courts sought to restrict its use through a narrow interpretation of
the Federal Probation Act.164 Like a charitable contribution, an SVR pay-
ment is not "restitution" within the narrow interpretation adopted by the
circuit courts under the Federal Probation Act.'65 Restitution is a payment
to a direct victim of a criminal act. 166 SVR is a payment to a symbolic
victim, generally the community or an organization which serves the
community. 67
SVR is comparable to traditional restitution, however, because it af-
fects the offender in a similar way. Both restitution and SVR foster the
offender's sense of responsibility for his unlawful actions. 68 With SVR, the
offender is forced to face the realization that his actions have caused a cer-
tain amount of harm to the local community. 6 9 SVR is also similar to resti-
tution because it serves as a deterrent to future criminal conduct. 170 SVR
162. Best & Birzon, supra note 46, at 826.
163. See supra note 143 (discussing how increasing the public nature of a sanction
heightens its deterrent effect).
164. See supra note 52 for the text of the restitution clause of the Federal Probation
Act. See also supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text (discussing the development of a
narrow interpretation of restitution under the Federal Probation Act in the circuit courts).
165. See cases cited supra note 59.
166. Best & Birzon, supra note 46, at 826.
167. See Yeager, supra note 15, at 225; United States v. Danilow Pastry Co., 563 F.
Supp. 1159, 1169 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). "To the extent that . . . [such] . . . sentences provide
restitution, such restitution is in the nature of 'symbolic restitution' designed primarily to deter
future misconduct on the part of the defendants rather than to provide compensation for their
victims." Id.
168. The Sentencing Reform Act states that one purpose of sentencing is that it should
reflect the seriousness of the offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A).
169. In Wright Contracting, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals quoted the district
court's reasoning from the unreported companion case United States v. Mid-Atlantic Paving
Co., (D. Md.). United States v. Wright Contracting Co., 728 F.2d 648, 650 (4th Cir. 1984).
The district court stated that the payment it had ordered would "put back into the immediate
local community some of the illegal gains which have been achieved by the [offenders] from
that community. ... Id.
170. In Wright Contracting, the District Court for the District of Maryland called its
order of SVR-type payments a form of "penance." United States v. Wright Contr. Co., 563 F.
Supp. 213, 214 (D. Md. 1983). The court stated that one of its purposes behind ordering
payments to local charities was "deterrence." Id. The payments were "not restitutional, repar-
ative, or in any way connected with reimbursing anyone for losses sustained as a result of this
specific crime. It is instead designed to punish defendant, specifically deter defendant and gen-
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achieves this deterrent effect by imposing suffering on the offender in a very
public fashion. 71 Further, SVR is especially useful when individual victims
are not easily identifiable, or when the victims are so numerous as to make
individual restitution impracticable. Because of its multi-faceted utility,
SVR, like restitution, should be considered a viable probationary option.
C. SVR and Community Service
An offender who has been ordered by the court to perform community
service 7' generally performs this service in the hours in which he is not
employed. As a form of symbolic restitution, 173 the performance of commu-
nity service fosters the offender's sense of responsibility for his unlawful
actions. 74 Also, like restitution, community service serves as both a specific
and general deterrent to crime. 17 5 Community service achieves this deter-
rent effect by imposing suffering upon the offender, specifically by depriving
him of his leisure time. This suffering is heightened by the fact that such
work is generally done within the public eye, thus maximizing the potential
for specific deterrence. This, in turn, increases the public's awareness of the
offender and his punishment and thereby provides a general deterrent effect
as well.
Under the Federal Probation Act, community service was held to be a
valid condition of probation. 76 The circuit courts, however, took a narrow
view of what was acceptable community service. For example, a defendant
ordered to accept full time employment without salary in a charitable or-
ganization was held valid.' 7 7 But a district court judge, who ordered an
offender to donate his services as a concert promoter to raise funds for a
community organization, was seen as abusing his discretionary authority. 78
erally deter other [defendants] contemplating similar criminal activity." Id.
171. See supra notes 141-49 and accompanying text (discussing the achievement of de-
terrence through the imposition of suffering in a public fashion).
172. Community service is unpaid work done for the community through an organiza-
tion which serves that community. See Berman & Hoelter, Client Specific Planning, 45 FED.
PROBATION 37, 39 (June 1981).
173. See Berman & Hoelter, supra note 172, at 39; United States v. Arthur, 602 F.2d
660, 664 (4th Cir. 1979); United States v. Danilow Pastry Co., 563 F. Supp. 1159, 1167
(S.D.N.Y. 1983).
174. See Berman & Hoelter, supra note 172, at 39; United States v. John Scher
Presents, Inc., 746 F.2d 959, 963 (3rd Cir. 1984).
175. See United States v. Arthur, 602 F.2d 660, 664 (4th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Danilow Pastry Co., 563 F. Supp. 1159, 1169 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). See also supra notes 162-63
and accompanying text (discussing how restitution effects deterrence to crime).
176. United States v. Arthur, 602 F.2d 660, 664 (4th Cir. 1979).
177. Id.
178. United States v. John Scher Presents, Inc., 746 F.2d 959 (3rd Cir. 1984). The
court reasoned that the condition of probation imposed on the offenders would not have altered
the offenders' behavior in any way. Id. at 963. The court stated:
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Direct payments of money to charitable organizations were also not a valid
form of community service under the Federal Probation Act.' 9
SVR is not community service within the narrow definition developed
by the circuit courts under the Federal Probation Act.'80 The Third Circuit
stated that community service should be strictly construed as actual labor
performed for the community.' SVR, however, is monetary payment to an
organization which serves the community.
Still, SVR is similar to community service in that SVR fulfills the
same purposes of sentencing as does community service. Both community
service and SVR can impress upon the offender a sense of responsibility for
his unlawful actions. This sense of responsibility is fostered by forcing the
offender to provide a valuable resource to the community. Thus, the of-
fender is forced to contemplate the actual harm that his actions have
caused to the community. Of equal importance to SVR's ability to foster
responsibility is the fact that SVR payments can be useful in funding com-
munity service work. 82 In his dissent in United States v. Missouri Valley
Construction Co., Circuit Judge Gibson recognized the value of community
service as a sentencing tool. 83 However, as Judge Gibson pointed out, com-
munity service organizations often require funding. 8 4 SVR payments can
be an important source for this much needed funding. 5
D. SVR and The Sentencing Reform Act
The Sentencing Reform Act has established a new set of goals for sen-
tencing in the federal criminal justice system. 18 6 Under the new Act, judges
have been granted broad discretion in the fashioning of probationary condi-
they would simply continue their normal business operations and promote concerts for
profit. The probationary condition ordered by the district court merely requires the corpo-
ration to pay money. The only difference between this condition and a fine is that here
the payee on the corporate checks would be a charitable organization rather than the
United States Treasury.
Id. The court concluded that as the condition of probation was essentially monetary, it would
have to fit within the three forms of monetary conditions listed in the Federal Probation Act.
Id.
179. See John Scher Presents, 746 F.2d 959; United States v. Wright Contracting Co.,
738 F.2d 648, 653 (4th Cir. 1984) (distinguishing its decision in United States v. Arthur).
180. See John Scher Presents, 746 F.2d at 962-63.
181. Id.
182. United States v. Missouri Valley Constr. Co., 741 F.2d 1542, 1553 (8th Cir. 1984)
(Gibson, J., concurring and dissenting).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See Yeager, supra note 15, at 226.
186. See supra note 80 (discussing the goals of sentencing under the Sentencing Reform
Act).
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tions to meet those goals. One of the goals of sentencing under the Sentenc-
ing Reform Act is that a sanction provide "just punishment."' 87 Read in
the context of the other purposes of sentencing under the new Act, the
words "just punishment" can be reasonably inferred to mean that Congress
intended that a sentence be punitive.'"
Like a fine,189 SVR serves a punitive function because it imposes suf-
fering on the offender. Because an SVR payment is more public in nature
than a fine, SVR can heighten the offender's punishment. Thus, SVR is
potentially more effective than a fine in providing "just punishment."
Deterrence is also an important goal for sentencing under the Sentenc-
ing Reform Act. 90 The Sentencing Reform Act states that a sentence
should "afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct."' 91 Read in the
context of the rest of the goals for sentencing set out in the new Act, it can
reasonably be inferred that Congress intended "deterrence" to mean spe-
cific deterrence. 92 This inference appears stronger if one interprets the goal
of sentencing, that a sanction "promote respect for the law,"'' 93 as meaning
general deterrence.194 Thus, the Sentencing Reform Act appears to man-
date that sentences should act as both specific and general deterrents to
crime.
Like restitution,9 5 SVR serves as both a specific and a general deter-
rent to crime. SVR serves as a specific deterrent because it inflicts suffering
on the offender by taking some of the offender's property. However, because
187. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (1985). See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 9, at 50,
reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3223.
188. See supra note 131 (discussing the punitive or retributive theory of punishment).
189. Under the Sentencing Reform Act, a district judge is authorized to order a fine as
a condition of probation. 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(2) (1985). Indeed, if the offender has been
convicted of a felony, the judge must order either a fine, restitution, or community service. 18
U.S.C. § 3563(a)(2) (1985). The explicit authorization to order a fine does not preclude the
district judge from ordering a condition of probation which is similar to a fine. See S. REP.
No. 225, supra note 9, at 95, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 3278.
190. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(A)-(B) (1985).
191. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B) (1985).
192. For a discussion of the theory of specific deterrence, see supra note 134.
193. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (1985).
194. See supra note 137 for a discussion of the theory of general deterrence.
195. The Sentencing Reform Act authorizes a district judge to order restitution as a
condition of probation. 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(3) (1985). Restitution is one of the three condi-
tions of probation, along with fines and community service, from which a district judge must
choose when sentencing a convicted felon to probation. 18 U.S.C. § 3563(a)(2) (1985). This
explicit authorization to order restitution does not prohibit a district judge from ordering con-
ditions of probation which are similar to restitution. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 9, at 95,
reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3278. Indeed, Congress has explicitly
authorized the district courts to order restitution which is not covered in § 3563(b)(3), under
the general provisions of § 3563(b)(20). See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 9, at 95-96, re-
printed in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3278.
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an SVR payment is more public in nature, it heightens the suffering and
therefore is more effective as a specific deterrent. Also, because of the
greater degree of publicity surrounding an SVR payment, it is more effec-
tive than restitution in effecting a general deterrent to crime.
The Sentencing Reform Act also requires that sentences should "re-
flect the seriousness of the offense,"'' 96 apparently to impress upon the of-
fender the reality of the harm that his act has wrought. This in turn tends
to foster the offender's sense of responsibility for his acts and the subse-
quent harm caused by those acts. Like restitution and community service,"'1
SVR payments foster the offender's sense of responsibility for his unlawful
acts.
SVR fosters the offender's sense of responsibility for his unlawful con-
duct in two ways. By tying the size of the SVR payment to some determi-
nation of the amount of harm the offender has caused, 9 8 SVR tends to
impress upon the offender the quantum of harm his acts have caused. Sec-
ondly, by directing the payment to a specific community service organiza-
tion, 99 SVR forces the offender to recognize the fact that his crime caused
harm to the local community. Increasing the offender's understanding of
the ramifications of his unlawful conduct arguably fosters the offender's
sense of responsibility for his criminal acts.
In sum, under the Sentencing Reform Act, Substitute Victim Restitu-
tion should be a permissible condition of probation. Further, SVR can be an
effective sanction in meeting the goals of sentencing set out in the new Act.
Specifically, an SVR payment can meet the goals of "just punishment" and
specific and general deterrence, and can reflect the seriousness of the of-
fense. However, to aid the district judge in the use of Substitute Victim
Restitution, guidelines are needed for the effective use of SVR in the sen-
tencing of individual offenders.
V. GUIDELINES
A. Inherently Economic Crime
For a court to justify the imposition of an SVR payment as a condition
196. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (1985).
197. The Sentencing Reform Act explicitly authorizes a district judge to order an of-
fender to work in community service. 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(13) (1985). In fact, a district judge
sentencing a felony offender to probation must order the offender to either work in community
service, make restitution, or pay a fine as a condition of his probation. 18 U.S.C. § 3563(a)(2)
(1985).
198. See infra notes 200-27 and accompanying text for a discussion on guidelines for the
use of SVR payments.
199. See infra notes 210-27 and accompanying text for a discussion on selecting a bene-
ficiary for an SVR payment.
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of probation, the offender must have profited economically from his crime.
This requirement serves three purposes. Tying SVR with an offender's ill-
gotten gain provides an equitable basis for SVR. Secondly, using SVR in
the sentencing of offenders who have profited from their crime gives the
court some framework for determining the amount of the SVR payment.
Lastly, the use of SVR with unjustly enriched offenders ensures fairness in
sentencing.
In equity, a court could impose a constructive trust whenever circum-
stances under which property was acquired made it unjust that it should be
retained by the possessor.200 By ordering an SVR payment, the court can be
seen as creating a constructive trust on the offender's ill-gotten gain for the
benefit of the community from which it was taken.20 1 The offender is de-
prived of the unjust enrichment that he received through his unlawful con-
duct and the money is returned to the community.
Inherently economic crimes provide a basis for the determination of
how large the SVR payment should be. A district judge who wishes to in-
corporate an SVR payment into a probation plan will need a guide for de-
ciding how large a payment to order. An offender's illegal profits provide
just such a guide. Also, by using illegal gains as a basis for an SVR order,
the risk of a judge appearing arbitrary in his sentencing is reduced. This in
turn reduces the potential that the district judge will create an appearance
of impropriety.
Lastly, the requirement that SVR only be used for offenders convicted
of inherently economic crimes ensures that all offenders are treated equally.
For the purposes of SVR, all offenders will be reviewed on the basis of their
crime, not on their financial status. This provides a sense of fairness to the
sentencing process.20 2
B. Community Service
Whenever SVR is imposed on an offender it must be accompanied by a
condition requiring the offender to perform community service. This com-
munity service should be performed by the offender for the organization
which is benefiting from his SVR payment.20 There are two reasons for
200. See 5 A. SCOTT, SCOTT ON TRUSTS § 462.2 (3rd ed. 1967).
201. See United States v. Wright Contracting Co., 728 F.2d 648, 650 (4th Cir. 1984)
(quoting the district court's reasoning for ordering an SVR-type payment in the unreported
decision of United States v. Mid-Atlantic Paving Co. (D. Md.)).
202. Fairness was a primary goal of the sentencing reform movement which culminated
in the Sentencing Reform Act. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 9, at 52, reprinted in 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3235. See also infra note 205 (discussing sentencing
discrepancies).
203. This was first recommended by Judge Gibson in his opinion in Missouri Valley.
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this requirement.
First, by requiring that all offenders who make SVR payments also
perform community service, fairness is maintained in the sentencing pro-
cess. 204 If a judge determines that he must make a choice between SVR and
community service, there may be a distinction between those offenders who
can afford to make SVR payments and those who cannot.20 5 Those who
could make such payments would more likely be ordered to do so. Those
who could not would more likely be ordered to work. If both SVR and
community service must be ordered concurrently the possibility of such a
distinction is eliminated. Also, by insisting that SVR be used in conjunction
with community service, the appearance that the offender exchanged money
for work is eliminated.20 This limits the potential for the appearance of
judicial impropriety. 20 7 Thus, requiring community service whenever SVR
is ordered helps to insure fairness in sentencing and reduces the appearance
of impropriety.
Community service also enhances the effectiveness of SVR to foster
the offender's sense of responsibility for his unlawful conduct. Properly se-
lected community service work 08 forces the offender to face the reality that
his acts have caused harm to the local community. When community ser-
vice is used in conjunction with SVR, the offender is given a firsthand look
at how both his labor and his illegal profits are being used for the benefit of
the community. This allows the sentence of probation to reflect the serious-
ness of the offense, one of the purposes of sentencing under the Sentencing
Reform Act.20 9
United States v. Missouri Valley Constr. Co., 741 F.2d 1542, 1553 (8th Cir. 1984) (Gibson,
J., concurring and dissenting).
204. See supra note 202 (discussing the importance of fairness in sentencing under the
Sentencing Reform Act).
205. A similar situation occurs when a judge must choose between a fine and imprison-
ment. See Note, Creative Punishment, supra note 46, at 60. The United States Supreme
Court has held that jailing an indigent offender for not paying a fine is a violation of equal
protection. See Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970);
Note, Creative Punishment, supra note 46, at 60 n.26. These rulings, however, do not cure
recurrent inequality when imprisonment is a legitimate statutory alternative to a fine. Id. at
60.
206. See generally United States v. Gustafson 587 F. Supp. 548 (D. Minn. 1984) (dis-
cussing the travesty upon the principle of 'equal justice for all' to permit offenders to trade
charitable contributions for jail time).
207. See supra note 126.
208. See infra notes 210-27 and accompanying text (discussing the selection of a recipi-
ent for the SVR payment).
209. See supra note 80.
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C. Choosing the Beneficiary: Rational Nexus Revisited
The use of the term "rational nexus" to describe a guideline for the
selection of a beneficiary for a charitable contribution was first suggested in
a law review note in 1985.210 The suggested rational nexus test21' is actually
a derivation of the "reasonable relationship" standard which existed under
the Federal Probation Act. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Porth v.
Templar, stated that the only limitation on the selection of probationary
conditions was that they have "a reasonable relationship to the treatment of
the accused and the protection of the public."21
The "reasonable relationship" standard was modified slightly in United
States v. Danilow Pastry Co.." ' In Danilow, the court stated that, in se-
lecting a beneficiary for community service, all that was necessary was a
"reasonable relationship between [the beneficiary] and the defendant's ille-
gal conduct, and . . . [that] . . . the community service serves to reverse
the damage done by that conduct.1114 The suggested rational nexus test
merely adds to this standard the suggestion that the selected charity help
the same class of people as harmed by the offender's conduct. 15
The suggested rational nexus test is helpful in selecting proper benefi-
ciaries for SVR payments. However, this note proposes a few additional
modifications to the rational nexus test to make it more effective in meeting
the goals of sentencing under the Sentencing Reform Act. The first modifi-
cation is to include SVR payments which have an impact on preventing
crimes similar to the defendant's offense within the penumbra of rational
nexus.216 Thus, an executive convicted of a Sherman Act violation could
210. See Note, Controversial Sanction, supra note 12, at 542 n.63 and accompanying
text.
211. "A rational nexus would exist if the charity helped the same class of people as
those harmed by the [offender's] offense, if the charity served to reverse the damage done by
the defendant's conduct, or if a reasonable relationship existed between the charity and the
[offender's] illegal conduct." Note, Controversial Sanction, supra note 12, at 542 n.63. While
this test has been suggested, as of this writing there has not been a decision in the federal
courts concerning the use of charitable contributions (SVR) as conditions of probation.
212. Porth v. Templar, 453 F.2d 330, 333 (10th Cir. 1971). Accord Fiore v. United
States, 696 F.2d 205, 208 (2nd Cir. 1982); United States v. Vaughn, 636 F.2d 921, 922-23
(4th Cir. 1980); Higdon v. United States, 627 F.2d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Pastore, 537 F.2d 675, 680-81 (2nd Cir. 1976); United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d
259, 264 (9th Cir. 1975).
213. United States v. Danilow Pastry Co., 563 F. Supp. 1159, 1171 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
214. Id.
215. Note, Controversial Sanction, supra note 12, at 542 n.63. See supra note 211, for
the full text of the suggested rational nexus test.
216. Arguably, this part of the test could fall within the "reasonable relationship" cate-
gory. See supra note 211. However, due to the historically narrow interpretation given to other
facets of probation in the federal courts, it is prudent to be as explicit as possible.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 23, No. 1 [1988], Art. 8
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol23/iss1/8
SUBSTITUTE VICTIM RESTITUTION
fund a chair in business ethics at a local university.2117 Similarly, a person
convicted of selling controlled substances could be ordered to fund an edu-
cation program which attempts to teach youth the perils of drug abuse.2"8
These types of SVR payments would not only act to deter future crime, but
would also foster the offender's sense of responsibility for the harm his ac-
tions have caused the community.
Another modification of the rational nexus test is the requirement that
the beneficiary and its programs be of a highly public nature.219 As the
court stated in Danilow,220 beneficiaries should be chosen "in order to fur-
ther the public awareness . . . of the punishment".22" ' While most potential
beneficiaries are likely to be of a public nature, the importance of publicity
to the effectiveness of SVR makes it necessary to explicitly suggest this
guideline. Similarly, while an SVR payment should be highly public, that
publicity should leave no doubt that the SVR payment is a punishment for
criminal conduct.222 The district judge "must make sure that the [SVR
payment] was established by court order to punish illegal and unethical
conduct." 223 If the SVR payment fails to subject the offender to negative
publicity, then its general and specific deterrent value is greatly
diminished.224
The modified rational nexus test,225 proposed by this note, helps ensure
217. See United States v. Missouri Valley Constr. Co., 741 F.2d 1542, 1545 (8th Cir.
1984). This type of probationary condition would be dependent on the offender also giving
lectures on the same topic, at the same university. See supra notes 203-09 and accompanying
text (discussing the importance of requiring both SVR and community service). See also Ren-
frew, The Paper Label Sentences: An Evaluation, 86 YALE L.J. 590 (1977) (Judge Charles B.
Renfrew discusses the conditions of probation he set in an unreported case which required
defendants, convicted of Sherman Act violations, to make public speeches on the evils of price
fixing).
218. This type of SVR payment would also require that the offender work for the anti-
drug program as well. See supra notes 203-09 and accompanying text (discussing the impor-
tance of joint SVR-community service conditions).
219. See supra notes 141-49 and accompanying text (discussing the affect that publicity
has on the deterrent effect of a sanction).
220. United States v. Danilow Pastry Co., 563 F. Supp. 1159 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
221. Id. at 1167.
222. See United States v. Missouri Valley Constr. Co., 741 F.2d 1542, 1551 (8th Cir.
1984) (Heaney, J., concurring and dissenting).
223. Id.
224. See supra notes 141-49 and accompanying text (discussing the positive effects pub-
licity has on the deterrent effect of punishment).
225. A rational nexus would exist if the charity or community service organization
either:
I. Helps the same class of people as those harmed by the offender's conduct, or
2. Serves to reverse the damage done by the offender's conduct or similar illegal con-
duct, or
3. Serves to prevent similar illegal conduct, or
4. There is a reasonable relationship between the offender, his offense, and the purpose
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that an SVR payment meets the goals for sentencing as set out in the Sen-
tencing Reform Act. The rational nexus test requires the SVR payment to
have some logical connection with the offender's illegal conduct. Thus, the
seriousness of the offense is reflected in the sentence. An SVR payment
having a rational nexus to the crime will also be of a highly public nature,
thereby increasing the general and specific deterrence of the sentence.
Lastly, the rational nexus test reduces the potential for the appearance of
judicial impropriety in sentencing. By restricting the district judge's choice
of beneficiaries to those with a rational nexus to the offender," '2 there is less
opportunity for an abuse of discretion.22
VI. CONCLUSION
The Sentencing Reform Act is a response to many of the inadequacies
which existed in the federal criminal justice system. It has replaced anti-
quated purposes with new goals. To meet these new goals, the Sentencing
Reform Act relies heavily on alternatives to the traditional sanctions of
fines and imprisonment. Probation has taken on new meaning as a conduit
for these alternatives. Thus, the Sentencing Reform Act has established
new guidelines and greater discretion to increase the effectiveness of proba-
tion in meeting the goals of sentencing.
Within this broad authority, district court judges should be able to or-
der Substitute Victim Restitution payments. The objections raised under
the Federal Probation Act, which were primarily objections regarding stat-
utory interpretation, no longer exist. In addition, this note suggests guide-
lines to prevent the shadow of impropriety from being cast over the judici-
ary. Therefore, there should not be any legal or ethical impediments to the
use of SVR. More importantly, however, because SVR can be effective in
of the organization or its programs
and the organization and/or it programs are of a highly public nature and will insure that the
SVR payment clearly leaves the impression that it was made as a punishment for illegal
conduct.
226. Prior to sentencing, the Sentencing Reform Act requires that a United States pro-
bation officer prepare a presentence report and present it to the district judge. 18 U.S.C. §
3552 (1985). A district judge also has the option of ordering an additional study on the of-
fender, if the judge requires information not normally included in the presentence report. 18
U.S.C. § 3552(b) (1985). It is suggested that the judge could, at his discretion, use this au-
thority to order a preliminary investigation regarding possible SVR beneficiaries. This would
help reduce any additional burden caused by the use of SVR as a probationary condition. Such
a report would also lend legitimacy to the SVR order because it would appear less arbitrary.
This in turn reduces the potential appearance of judicial impropriety. However, if the judge
orders such a report, it is recommended that the person preparing the report apply the rational
nexus test in the selection of possible beneficiaries.
227. See Note, Controversial Sanction, supra note 12, at 542-43. While possible con-
flicts with the 'establishment clause' may still exist, they are outside the scope of this note.
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meeting the goals of sentencing under the Sentencing Reform Act, it is
hoped that courts will make use of this valuable sentencing tool.
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